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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
I. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Molina v. Richardson, J the plaintiff filed a civil rights 
action against two Los Angeles police officers seeking compensa-
tory and punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 19832 for 
alleged violations of his constitutional rights.3 He named as an 
additional defendant the City of Los Angeles and sought damages 
from the city under the principle of vicarious liability, as the 
employer of the police officers, based, in part, on section 1983 and 
on the general "federal question" jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 
section 1331.4 The city was granted a dismissal for failure to state 
a cause of action and the case against the officers resulted in a 
jury award of $65.75 compensatory damages against each of 
them.5 Molina appealed the dismissal of the claim against the 
city. The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the dismissal, held that 
section 1983 precludes municipal liability based solely on the 
1. 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. July, 1978) (per Wallace, J.; Grant, D.J., sitting by designa-
tion filed a dissenting opinion; the other panel member was Wright, J.). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
3. Molina had been stopped by the police officers while driving in Los Angeles be-
cause the rear license plate of his automobile lacked a current registration sticker. He 
showed the sticker to the officers and gave an explanation. A dispute arose and Molina 
was forcibly removed from the vehicle by the officers, handcuffed, taken to the police 
station, and booked for resisting arrest. No charges were filed against him. The alleged 
violations included his "Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest unless based upon 
probable cause, his guarantee under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments against depri-
vation of liberty without due process of law, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment." 578 F.2d at 847. 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) provides in relevant part: "(a) The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the 
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States." Molina alleged damages in excess of $10,000 and, 
to meet the "federal question" requirement, asserted that "a cause of action for vicarious 
liability ... may be inferred directly from the text ofthe Fourteenth Amendment." 578 
F.2d at 848. 
5. [d. at 847. 
27 
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doctrine of respondeat superior and refused to find such cause of 
action arising directly from the fourteenth amendment.6 
B. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES 
Pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment, and 
partially in response to unredressed violence against former 
slaves in the post-Civil War South,7 Congress enacted the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. sections 1981-
1985 (the Act). It was not until ninety years later, in Monroe v. 
Pape,8 that the United States Supreme Court expanded the scope 
of the Act by its interpretation of the phrase "under color of" 
state law.9 The Court held that section 1983 granted a cause of 
action for damages against police officers who had allegedly vio-
lated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 1o 
In so doing, however, the Court limited the scope of potential 
defendants to individuals. II Relying primarily on the Congres-
sional Debates surrounding the unsuccessful Sherman Amend-
ment to the Act, the Monroe Court concluded that the 1871 Con-
gress did not intend that local governments be included in the 
definition of "person" for purposes of section 1983. 12 The Court 
granted municipal governments absolute immunity from liability 
under the section. 13 
6. [d. at 848. 
7. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-73 (1961). 
8. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
9. Quoting with approval the meaning given to "under color of' state law in United 
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 325, 326 by Justice Stone (later Chief Justice): "[Mjisuse of 
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of state law." 365 U.S. 
at 184. 
10. [d. at 187. The Monroe family had been awakened in the middle of the night by 
thirteen Chicago police officers who broke into their home, ordered Mr. and Mrs. Monroe 
and their children into the living room, ordered them to strip naked, emptied the closets 
and drawers during a "search" throughout the home, and finally took Mr. Monroe to the 
police station where he was held for 10 hours without seeing a magistrate, and finally 
released without charges being filed. [d. at 169. 
11. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 
85 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1972); Kates and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 
1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972); Note, Damages Remedies 
Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922 (1976). 
12. "The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for 
certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so 
antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act 
to include them." 365 U.S. at 191 (footnote omitted). 
13. [d. at 187. 
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While some lower courts avoided the harsh result of Monroe 
v. Pape by finding a cause of action against municipalities de-
rived directly from the Constitution,14 the Supreme Court, in 
Moor v. County of Alameda, 15 adhered to its holding in Monroe 
that a municipality is not a "person" under section 1983. In Moor, 
Justice Marshall, writing for eight members of the Court, held 
that the county was immune from liability notwithstanding a 
California statute making the county vicariously liable for the 
acts of its officers. Ie 
Finally, seventeen years after the Monroe decision, in Monell 
v. Department of Social Services, 17 the Supreme Court reviewed 
once again the legislative history of the Act and decided that the 
Monroe Court had misinterpreted the intent of Congress, and 
overruled that portion of the holding in Monroe v. Pape which 
granted absolute immunity to-municipal governments. IS The 
Monell Court held that municipalities are, in fact, "persons" for 
purposes of section 1983. \9 
14. See note 48 infra. 
15. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). 
16. One of the plaintiffs, Rundle, had attempted to hold the county liable through 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides, in relevant part: 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the 
district courts . . . for the protection of all persons in the 
United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, 
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of 
the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the 
same into effect; but in all cases where they. . . are deficient 
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies. . . the 
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and 
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of 
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). His argument was that § 1983 was insufficient to vindicate his 
rights in that municipalities were immune from liability and that, therefore, California's 
vicarious liability statute should govern by way of § 1988. The Court held that the state's 
statute was inconsistent with federal law and § 1988, therefore, was not applicable. 411 
U.S. at 706. The logic of this holding was somewhat strained by the particular facts of 
the case. Two plaintiffs, Moor and Rundle, were allegedly injured by the wrongful dis-
charge of a shotgun by an Alameda County deputy sheriff while engaged in quelling a civil 
disturbance. [d. at 695. The cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. [d. at 698. 
Moor was not a citizen of California and had relied on diversity jurisdiction. [d. at 696. 
Based on diversity jurisdiction, Moor was permitted to maintain his action for damages 
pursuant to California law for constitutional violations for which Rundle had no remedy. 
[d. at 721. 
17. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
18. [d. at 663. 
19. [d. at 690. See Note, Liability of State and Local Governments Under 42 U.S.C. 
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In Monell, a class of female employees of New York City's 
Board of Education and Department of Social Services sued the 
city, the Board, the Department, and certain individuals in their 
official capacities for alleged violations of their constitutional 
rights by defendants' policy offorcing pregnant employees to take 
unpaid leaves of absence before medically necessary. The action 
was based upon section 1983.20 
The Court meticulously re-examined the legislative debates 
on the Act of 1871 and determined that the Monroe Court's reli-
ance on the rejection of the Sherman Amendment was mis-
placed.21 In addition, only a few months prior to passage of the 
Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress had passed the Dictionary Act in 
which the word "person" is defined to "include corporations ... 
as well as individuals. "22 Two years prior to the enactment of both 
Acts municipal corporations were included in the definition of 
corporations.23 Thus, the Monell Court overruled the holding in 
Monroe that municipalities enjoy absolute immunity under sec-
tion 1983. 
Although vicarious liability was not an issue in Monell, as all 
individuals were sued only in their official capacities and the 
alleged violations resulted from government policy, the Monell 
Court concluded 
that a local government may not be sued under § 
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees 
or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a gov-
ernment's policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may 
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts 
the injury that the government as an entity is re-
sponsible under § 1983.24 . 
The Monell Court, although not compelled to do so under the 
facts before it, denied any liability of municipalities based on the 
doctrin~ of respondeat superior. 25 
§ 1983, 92 HARV. L. REv. 311 (1978). 
20. 436 U.S. at 660·61. 
21. [d. at 669. 
22. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see 436 U.S. at 689 n. 53. 
23. [d. at 688, citing Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. 118, 121 (1868). 
24. 436 U.S. at 694. 
25. [d. 
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C. DAMAGES ACTIONS ARISING DIRECTLY OUT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
In Bell v. Hood,28 the Supreme Court decided that federal 
courts have jurisdiction to entertain actions for damages for the 
invasion of constitutional rights. In that case, plaintiffs brought, 
an action against FBI agents for alleged violations of plaintiffs' 
fourth and fifth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures and deprivation of liberty without due pro-
cess.27 The district court dismissed, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, for want of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 
41(1) (now 28 U.S.C. section 1331), the general "federal question" 
jurisdiction statute.28 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
"where the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek recovery 
directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the. 
federal court, but for two possible exceptions later noted, must 
entertain the suit. "29 The Bell Court did not decide whether a 
cause of action for damages may be had directly out of the 'Consti-
tution. 
The opportunity to decide the second question, whether al-
leged deprivation of constitutional rights would give rise to a 
cause of action for damages not expressly authorized by statute, 
came before the Court in 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 30 In an opinion written by Justice 
Brennan, the Court answered that question in the affirmative. 31 
The case arose under a similar fact situation as that in Bell v. 
Hood. Plaintiff sued federal narcotics agents for alleged violations 
of his fourth and fifth amendment rights and sought damages in 
excess of the jurisdictional requirement as a result of defendants' 
unlawful conduct. The district court dismissed, and the Second 
Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the complaint failed to state 
a cause of action.32 
In reversing, the Supreme Court made clear the fact that the 
fourth amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches 
26. 327 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1946). 
27. [d. at 679. 
28. [d. at 680. 
29. [d. at 681-82. The two possible exceptions are (1) where the federal claim is 
immaterial and asserted only to obtain jurisdiction; and (2) where the claim is frivolous. 
[d. at 682-83. 
30. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
31. [d. at 397. 
32. [d. at 390. 
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and seizures "carried out by virtue of federal authority"33 and 
that the guarantee is not dependant upon a remedy provided by 
the state in which the violation occurred. 34 Acknowledging that 
special factors, in some cases, might call for hesitation in finding 
a cause of action directly out of the Constitution "in the absence 
of affirmative action by Congress, "35 the Court found no such 
factors in Bivens. 36 
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion found the question 
involved to be "whether compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 
'appropriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted."37 He 
determined that damages would be the only possible remedy for 
Bivens, and based his decision on (1) the inadequacy of state tort 
law remedies; (2) sovereign immunity barring suit against the 
agents' employer; (3) the inadequacy of injunctive relief; and (4) 
the irrelevance of the exclusionary rule. 3s 
The Bivens decision was interpreted almost immediately as 
a possible route around the harshness of the Monroe decision.3D 
The rationale was that due to municipal immunity from section 
1983 liability (at least prior to Monell) the courts should infer 
"necessity" of a direct cause of action arising directly out of the 
fourteenth amendment against municipalities. State remedies 
may be inadequate. 4o In addition, section 1983 actions against the 
responsible officials, rather than the municipal employer, are 
often only illusory. The difficulty of identifying the responsible 
individual, the lack of financial means to support a judgment, 
and the broad "good faith" defense of officials acting within the 
scope of their employment often prevent plaintiffs from pursuing 
their claims against the responsible individualsY Similarly, ju-
rors are often unwilling to impose substantial judgments against 
33. [d. at 392. 
34. [d. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
35. [d. at 396. 
36. The special factors enumerated in the opinion include (1) federal fiscal policy; 
(2) liability of a congressional employee; and (3) "explicit congressional declaration that 
persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover 
money damages from the agents." [d. at 396-97. 
37. [d. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
38. [d. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
39. See generally authorities cited at note 11 supra. 
40. 403 U.S. at 391-95. 
41. See Dellinger, supra note 11, at 1553; Kates and Kouba, supra note 11, at 136-
37; Note, supra note 11, at 922-23. 
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individuals who have merely erred in doing their jobs}2 Finally, 
social policy may favor spreading the risks and holding munici-
palities liable to deter continuation of governmental policies 
which prove to be contrary to constitutional requirements.43 
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 44 the Supreme Court, by impli-
cation, extended the Bivens doctrine in holding that municipali-
ties may be sued for constitutional violations directly under the 
fourteenth amendment. 45 In that case, plaintiffs brought suit 
under section 1983 for injunctive relief against the cities of Racine 
and Kenosha, Wisconsin. Relying entirely on Monroe v. Pape, the 
Court held that municipalities were not "persons" under section 
1983 for purposes of injunctive relief. However, the Court re-
manded to the district court to consider jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. section 1331 and the protection against denial of "liberty" 
and "property" without due process as provided by the four-
teenth amendment. 48 The case has been read equally as an exten-
sion of Monroe to suits for injunctive relief and as an extension 
of the Bivens doctrine to include suits against municipalities as 
arising directly out of the fourteenth amendment. 47 Lower courts, 
relying on the "inadequacy of other remedies" argument of 
Bivens, and the implied carte blanche of Bruno have extended 
the Bivens doctrine to include suits against municipalities for 
violations of constitutional rights}S This is, in fact, what the 
42. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 421-22 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
43. Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E.D.Pa. 1977). 
44. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). 
45. Id. at 514-15. 
46.Id. 
47. See, e.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732, 735 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1975), 
rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
48. See generally Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other 
grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. 
Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (extension of Bivens doctrine to municipality for vicarious 
liability); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D.Cal. 1974) (zoning); but see 
Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), on remand, 
591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (The circuit court extended Bivens to action against munici-
pality for acts of police officers sanctioned by the city. The Supreme Court remanded to 
the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Monell. On remand, the circuit 
court decided that it would be unnecessary to extend Bivens because of the action, avail-
able since Monell, under § 1983.); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 
1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), on remand, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978). Cf. Williams 
v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill., 1975) (extended Bivens doctrine to a municipality 
for acts of police officers on respondeat superior theory; the holding was later rejected by 
the Seventh Circuit in Jamison v. McCunie, 565 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977), which refused 
to hold a city liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior) . 
• 
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Ninth Circuit was asked, but refused to do in Molina v. 
Richardson. 
D. THE Molina DECISION 
In affirming the district court's dismissal of Molina's claim 
against the city, the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's 
decision in Monell (decided only a few weeks prior to Molina) and 
determined that the new, but limited, municipal liability af-
forded under section 1983 did not extend to Molina's claim, which 
was allegedly based solely on respondeat superior.49 The court 
then decided that plaintiffs argument for a cause of action aris-
ing directly out of the fourteenth amendment, by analogy to 
Bivens, was not constitutionally mandated5U and would be an 
"unwise use of judicial power. "51 
E. THE Monell TEST 
The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected Molina's section 1983 
claim by following the dicta in Monell to the effect that a munici-
pality cannot be held liable under that statute "solely because it 
employs a tortfeasor."52 The doctrine of respondeat superior was 
not an issue before the Court in Monell, where the violations 
alleged were done pursuant to governmental policy.53 In overrul-
ing Monroe, Monell made it clear that municipalities may be 
sued for constitutional violations subject to vindication under 
section 1983.54 It is obvious, at least since the Monell decision, 
that a local government may be held liable to a plaintiff who can 
prove that an ordinance passed by the governmental unit consti-
tuted an uncompensated taking of property and the plaintiff was 
injured thereby.55 It is equally obvious from the dicta in Monell 
that a municipality may not be held liable solely because a po-
liceman, rather than a private individual, was involved in an 
automobile accident in which plaintiff was injured."6 However, 
there is a broad range of possibilities between these two examples 
49. 578 F.2d at 848. 
50. [d. at 850. 
51. [d. at 851. 
52. 436 U.S. at 691. 
53. [d. at 661. 
54. [d. at 663. 
55. See Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978). Indeed, causes of 
action for such violations have been granted prior to Monell by extending Bivens. See, 
e.g., Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D.Cal. 1974). 
56. 436 U.S. at 691. 
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in which to find varying degrees of culpable action or inaction on 
the part of the municipal employer. Should the municipal em-
ployer be liable for injuries occurring during a riot? What if the 
municipality had never trained its police officers in techniques 
and procedures for quelling a riot? The answer to the second 
question may, in fact, be in the affirmative. But to find the an-
swer, more information is required than that contained in the 
Monell opinion. 
The Ninth Circuit, without the benefit of further clarifica-
tion as to where the line should be drawn, relied on the pleadings 
and argument of Molina, submitted prior to Monell, which did 
not meet the requisite degree of "official policy."57 A more reason-
able approach would have been to remand to the district court 
to determine whether Molina could have stated a cause of action 
to meet the new Monell test. 58 This is especially true since, at the 
time Molina was before the district court, a municipality was 
clearly not a potential defendant under section 1983, and he had 
no legal reason to argue otherwise. While the dicta denying vicari-
ous liability is strong, the Supreme Court in Monell allowed for 
much latitude in its test for liability. 
Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983 
action against a government body is an allegation 
that official policy is responsible for a deprivation 
of rights protected by the Constitution, local gov-
ernments, like every other § 1983 "person," by the 
very terms of the statute, may be sued for consti-
tutional deprivations visited pursuant to govern-
mental "custom" even though such a custom has 
not received formal approval through the body's 
official decisionmaking channels. 5D 
57. Quoting Monell, the Molina court held: "Molina did not argue before the district 
court that the allegedly illegal conduct of the officers 'may fairly be said to represent [the 
city's] official policy.' Thus, Monell does not give Molina a section 1983 cause of action 
against the city." 578 F.2d at 848 (emphasis and alteration in the original). 
58. It is not uncommon for appellate courts to remand for consideration in light of 
new law, see Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978) (extended Bivens and 
remanded in light of Monell), or with leave to amend the pleadings, see Hitt v. City of 
Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1977). In addition, the duty of the appellate court is to 
apply the law existing at the time of the decision. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1977); 
Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). 
59. 436 U.S. at 690-91 (emphasis added). 
9
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F. DENIAL OF EXTENSION OF Bivens 
In deciding that a direct, constitutional cause of action would 
not be appropriate under the circumstances of Molina's claim, 
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the history of the Bivens doctrine and 
the implications of its possible extension in this case. 
First, the Ninth Circuit noted that one purpose of the Bivens 
decision was to fill a gap left by the legislature in creating a 
remedy for constitutional violations. so Section 1983 made avail-
able a cause of action for deprivations committed "under color 
of' state law.81 The legislature has not acted in the same fashion 
to redress constitutional violations committed under color of fed-
eral law. The Bivens Court "strongly implied that specific con-
gressional action might have precluded the judicial creation of a 
damages remedy in that case,"82 thus, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the Bivens decision was not constitutionally man-
dated and; therefore, an extension of the doctrine is likewise not 
compelled.83 Once the court found that an extension of the doc-
trine was not required by the Constitution, it went on to analyze 
the prudential considerations involved in such an extension to 
include municipal liability. 
The Molina court based its decision not to extend Bivens to 
include vicarious liability of the municipal employer, in part, out 
of deference to the legislature. In comparing Molina's claim to 
that of Bivens, the court noted the immense body of legislation 
resulting from the fourteenth amendment.84 Legislation pursuant 
to the enabling clause80 of the fourteenth amendment has been 
sparse in the area of vicarious liability, however. 66 Because of that 
sparseness, the Monell Court had,concluded that the legislative 
history of section 1983 shows an intent to exclude vicarious liabil-
ity of municipalities.87 The Ninth Circuit accepted this conclu-
60. 578 F.2d at 851. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 850. 
63. [d. at 850-51. 
64. Congress has produced legislation regulating state action not only in the Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871 and other 19th Century civil rights statutes but also, quite substantially, 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [d. at 851. . 
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to en-
force. by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 
66. 578 F.2d at 851 n. 12. 
67. 436 U.S. at 691. 
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sion and determined that it would be inappropriate for the federal 
judiciary to disregard the clearly cautionary view of the legisla-
ture with regard to vicarious liability.68 District Judge Grant, in 
his dissenting opinion to the Molina decision, strongly rejected 
this argument. Basing his analysis upon the ambiguity of the 
meaning of "person" in section 1983 from Monroe through Monell 
he argued: 
Indeed, it would seem to be an unwise use of judi-
cial power, and inconsistent with the principles of 
clear statement, to extrapolate from the tarnished 
analysis of ambiguous statutory language in 
Monroe and conclude that Congress has explicitly 
determined to preempt the field of municipallia-
bility when the result seriously restricts the reme-
dies available to a court in constitutional adjudi-
cation. 8u 
Next, the Ninth Circuit considered the doctrine of federal-
ism. The court reasoned that if the federal judiciary creates a 
federal cause of action to resolve disputes between individual 
citizens and local governments, the "states and their political 
subdivisions will likely be inhibited from seeking creative, effica-
tious resolutions to such disputes. "70 While this argument has 
some merit, it is somewhat weakened by the number of federal 
court decisions granting broad injunctive relief against munici-
palities, notably in the areas of school desegregation and prison-
ers' rights litigation.71 Indeed, as Judge Grant reasoned in his 
dissent, when considering the difficulties involved in holding in-
dividual municipal employees liable and the requirement of 
"official policy" to hold municipalities liable under section 1983, 
it would seem that municipal governments, not vicariously liable 
under the Constitution, would have less incentive to create more 
adequate hiring and training procedures to insure a reduction in 
constitutional violations of its employees.72 
68. In his concurring opinion in Monell, Justice Powell expressed his belief that 
municipal liability would be the same under § 1983 or the Constitution and that the better 
reasoned approach would be to find liability under the statute rather than through exten-
sion of Bivens. "~ther than constitutionalize a cause of action against local government 
that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better course is to confess error and set the 
record straight, as the Court does today." [d. at 713. 
69. 578 F.2d at 855. 
70. [d. at 852. 
71. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) and 
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D.Cal. 1972). 
72. 578 F.2d at 855 (Grant, D.J., dissenting). 
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Finaliy, the court determined that section 1983 provides an 
adequate remedy against municipal governments. In so doing, it 
rejected both arguments of unwillingness of juries to hold individ-
uals liable and deterrence of future wrongdoing as "speculative 
at best. "73 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm the dismissal against 
the city based on section 1983 was unreasonable due to the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court in Monell. The arguments by Mol-
ina were made without the benefit of the Supreme Court's radical 
change in interpretation of municipal immunity under section 
1983 and therefore, he should have been given the chance to re-
argue in light of Monell. In addition, while the court correctly 
determined that an extension of the Bivens doctrine was discre-
tionary, the prudential considerations in the court's analysis were 
inadequate to justify the complete denial of a federal forum to 
redress the constitutional wrongs of which Molina complained. 
Had the court allowed Molina a chance to show that he had a 
cause of action under section 1983, the decision not to extend 
Bivens because section 1983 is adequate, may have been more 
easily justified; but to say that he has an adequate remedy under 
section 1983, and at the same time deny him the right to proceed 
under the statute, is, at best, inconsistent. As Justice Black 
stated in his opinion for the Court in Bell v. Hood: "And it is also 
well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a 
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such inva-
sion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good 
the wrong done."7. 
Maxine Salzman 
73. [d. at 853. Perhaps Molina is a clear example of the faulty nature of the court's 
classification of these arguments as "speculative." Molina, allegedly for his failure to 
remove his driver's license from a clear plastic container, was removed by force from his 
automobile, handcuffed, taken to the police station and booked for resisting arrest. For 
this incident, he was awarded by jury verdict a total of $131.50. [d. at 847. It seems hardly 
likely that he was adequately compensated for his injuries. 
74. 327 U.S. at 684. 
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II. MANDATORY MATERNITY LEAVES UNDER TITLE 
VII AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1872, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state 
law denying women admission to the practice of law.' In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Bradley stated: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has al-
ways recognized a wide difference in the respec-
tive spheres and destinies of man and woman 
.... The natural and proper timidity and deli-
cacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life 
The paramount destiny and mission of wo-
man are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.2 
One' hundred years later, in 1973, Karen deLaurier, a junior 
high school language teacher, became pregnant. In deLaurier u. 
San Diego Unified School District,3 she challenged the school 
district's policy which required that she take a mandatory ma-
ternity leave of absence at the beginning of the ninth month of 
pregnancy and denied her the use of accumulated sick leave ben-
efits while on the mandatory leave. Her challenge was based 
upon alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,4 and the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
fifth a~d fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. The dis-
trict court rejected the challenge, granting a summary judgment, 
and upheld the school district's policy both as to the mandatory 
leave and the denial of sick leave benefits.5 Regarding mandatory 
1. Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. (Wall. 16) 130 (1872). 
2. 1d. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
3. 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were Huf-
stedler, J., concurring and dissenting, and Smith, D.J.). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) provides in relevant part: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's. . . sex. . . ; or (2) to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex .... 
5. 588 F.2d at 675. 
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maternity leaves, the Ninth Circuit found a prima facie case of 
discrimination under Title VII but affirmed the district court, 
holding that the school district successfully raised the defense of 
business necessity;8 the court rejected deLaurier's fourteenth 
amendment arguments;7 and Judge Hudstedler filed a vigorous 
dissent regarding the business necessity defense.8 
No one in the United States today will deny that women are 
afforded substantially greater rights than at the time Justice 
Bradley wrote his concurring opinion to Bradwell. However, leg-
islation and litigation in the area of sex discrimination, and par-
ticularly with reference to pregnancy and employment, have pro-
vided a complicated and confusing patchwork of rules and tests.' 
This Note will explore the existing guidelines under which Title 
vn and fourteenth amendment sex discrimination claims are 
brought, focusing on the Ninth Circuit's most recent application 
of those guidelines in its deLaurier opinion. 
B. TITLE vn AND MANDATORY MATERNITY LEAvn; 
The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a three-
step analysis to be used in determining whether an employer's 
practices violate Title VII. to In McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. 
6. [d. at 683. Regarding the sick leave policy, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the 
denial of sick leave benefits discriminatory and remanding for further proceedings con-
cerning the school district's defenses. This issue will not be discussed further because 
subsequent legislation renders it moot. See notes 68 & 69 infra and accompanying text. 
7. [d. at 684. 
8. [d. at 685-92 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting). 
9. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex classifications require interme-
diate level of scrutiny) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (four Justices 
concluded in plurality opinion that sex classifications' require strict scrutiny). See also 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (pregnancy classification not gender-based dis-
crimination). Justice Stevens commented on the confusing nature of existing law in his 
concurring opinion in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977): 
The general problem is to decide when a company policy 
which attaches a special burden to the risk of absenteeism 
caused by pregnancy is a prima facie violation of the statutory 
prohibition against sex discrimination. The answer "always," 
which I had thought quite plainly correct, is foreclosed by the 
Court's holding in Gilbert. The answer "never" would seem to 
be dictated by the Court's view that a discrimination against 
pregnancy in "not a gender-based discrimination at all." The 
Court has, however, made it clear that the correct answer is 
"sometimes. " 
[d. at 153-54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
10. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 434 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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Green,1I the Court first articulated its three-step test to clarify 
the confusion lower courts were experiencing in the placement of 
burdens of proof in a Title vn case"! 
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Pow-
ell, carefully outlined the three steps necessary to determine 
whether the employer has in fact violated the statute. First, the 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. IS 
Once this is established, the defendant is given the opportunity 
to rebut the prima facie case by showing "some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."14 This, how-
ever, is not the end of the inquiry. The third step requires that 
although a prima facie case of discrimination may be success-
fully rebutted by· some articulated, nondiscriminatory reason, 
the plaintiff must then be given "a full and fair opportunity to 
demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively 
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially 
discriminatory decision. "15 
The Prima Facie Case 
Until 1974, a classification made on the basis of pregnancy 
was probably assumed to be a distinction made on the basis of 
sex. However, in that year the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Geduldig v. Aiellol8 and declared that such a classification 
is not gender-basedY In its often-quoted footnote 20, the major-
ity opinion stated, "[t]he program divides potential recipients 
11. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell case involved a black former employee of 
the aerospace manufacturer who, after having been laid off after eight years of employ-
ment, actively and unlawfully protested the allegedly racial motivation of the employer's 
general hiring practices and his own discharge. Shortly thereafter, the employer adver-
tised a position for which Green qualified. He applied and was rejected due to his unlaw-
ful protests against the corporation. [d. at 794-96. Green then made a timely claim with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and eventually brought suit in 
the district court charging Title VII violations. [d. at 796-98. 
12. [d. at 801. 
13. [d. at 802. 
14. [d. This second step, often referred to as the business necessity defense, has been 
articulated by the Court in varying degrees of proof required to rebut the prima facie 
case. The quoted phrase in McDonnell is rather broad, presumably in deference to the 
employer who was subjected to illegal, disruptive protests by the plaintiff. In other cases, 
the articulated standard is more restrictive. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 
(1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
15. 411 U.S. at 805. 
16. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
17. [d. at 496-97 n.20. 
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into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. 
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes 
members of both sexes. illS 
Geduldig involved an equal protection challenge by a preg-
nant woman to California's state disability insurance program 
which provided benefits to private employees for temporary disa-
bilities not covered by workmen's compensation. The program 
excluded normal pregnancy and childbirth from its definition of 
eligible disabilities. Although the Court found that the state had 
legitimate interests in excluding pregnancy and childbirth, nota-
bly cost, the determination that the program was valid was 
based on the fact that the exclusion was not an invidious dis-
crimination in violation of the equal protection clause. lu The 
Court reasoned that the program, as it stood, protected men and 
women equally, and the denial of an additional benefit to women 
was, therefore, not discriminatory.2o 
Two years later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,21 the 
Court was confronted with a Title VII challenge to an almost 
identical disability program provided by a private employer. Fol-
lowing its reasoning in Geduldig, the Gilbert Court found that 
where men and women are entitled to the same benefits, the de-
nial of an additional benefit to women for pregnancy-related dis-
abilities was not gender-based discrimination in violation of Ti-
tle VII.22 From Gilbert it would be logical to assume that 
distinctions made on the basis of pregnancy-although clearly 
affecting only females-are not sufficient to establish a prima fa-
cie case of sex discrimination under Title vn.23 
However, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,24 the Court distin-
guished Gilbert and invalidated an employer's policy which vio-
lated Title vn by its discriminatory effect on pregnant women.25 
18. [d. 
19. [d. at 496-97 n.20. 
20. [d. at 496-97. 
21. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
22. [d. at 136. 
23. See Justice Stevens' comment at note 7 supra. Although Gilbert was a Title VII 
case and Geduldig was based on the equal protection clause. a challenge on due process 
grounds relating to pregnancy was successful in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur. 414 
U.S. 632 (1974). 
24. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
25. [d. at 142. 
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The challenged policy required that pregnant employees take a 
formal leave of absence during which the employee received no 
sick pay and also lost all accumulated job seniority.28 In refer-
ence to the seniority issue, the Sa tty Court reasoned that, unlike 
the "additional benefit" in Gilbert, this program imposed an ad-
ditional burden on women that men do not suffer,27 thereby vio-
lating Title VII.28 
It is clear from Geduldig, Gilbert, and Satty that in order to 
make • out a prima facie case of sex discrimination regarding 
pregnancy-related classifications, the plaintiff must show that 
the challenged policy imposes an additional burden upon women 
which men need not suffer, rather than that it denies an addi-
tional benefit which men need not receive. 29 
Business Necessity 
In Griggs v. Duke Power CO.,30 black employees challenged 
the defendant employer's requirement of a high school diploma 
or the passing of a standardized intelligence test (unrelated to 
job performance) as a condition of employment or transfer as ra-
cial discrimination in violation of Title VIT.31 Tile district court 
found, and the court of appeals agreed, that although the com-
pany had been guilty of racial discrimination in the past, there 
was no intent or purpose to discriminate in the company's enact-
ment of this policy which, therefore, did not violate the statute. 32 
26. [d. at 137. 
27. [d. at 142. 
28. The Court remanded on the issue of sick leave benefits, finding the policy to be 
neutral on its face, for a determination of whether the policy had a discriminatory effect. 
[d. at 145-46. 
29. On October 31, 1978 Congress amended Title VII overruling the holding in Gil-
bert. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978) was added, providing in relevant part: 
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, 
but are not limited to, because or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected 
by pregnancy ... shall be treated the same for all employ-
ment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under 
fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or unability to work. 
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
31. [d. at 425-26. 
32. [d. at 428-30. The policy resulted in a disproportionate number of blacks being 
ineligible for employment or transfer. [d. at 429. The Court cited statistics for North 
Carolina from the 1960 census which indicated that 34% of white males and 12% of black 
males had completed high school. Even greater disparity was evidenced by an EEOC 
study of standardized tests such as those used by Duke Power. [d. at 430 n.6. 
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In reversing, the Supreme Court held that, even assuming the 
practice to be neutral both on its face and in its intent, if its 
effect is discriminatory it will fail unless the employer can show 
"a manifest relationship to the employment in question."3s Chief 
Justice Burger declared for a unanimous Court34 that "[t]he 
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related 
to job performance, the practice is prohibited. "35 
Since Griggs, the "business necessity" or "job-relatedness" 
defense has been considered in Title vn cases involving a broad 
spectrum of situations, other than standardized tests and di-
ploma requirements.3u However, the standard as enunciated by 
the Griggs Court to be used in determining the validity of a dis-
criminatory employment practice is strict. "What Congress com-
manded is that any tests used must measure the person for the 
job and not the person in the abstract."37 
The third step of the McDonnell analysis-plaintiff's rebut-
tal of the business necessity defense-had its genesis in the lan-
guage of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,38 where the Court stated 
that a policy which is neutral on its face may nonetheless be pro-
hibited if it is merely a pretext or subterfuge to "accomplish a 
forbidden discrimination, "su such as might easily be inferred 
from the facts of Griggs.40 In Dothard v. Rawlinson,41 the Su-
preme Court was faced with a Title vn attack upon Alabama's· 
height and weight requirements for employment as prison guards 
which allegedly disqualified a disproportionate number of wo-
33. [d. at 432. 
34. All Justices joined in the Chief Justice's opinion except Justice Brennan, who 
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
35. [d. at 43l. 
36. See, e.g., Nashvi1le Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (loss of seniority bene-
fits during forced pregnancy leave held invalid); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 
(1977) (height and· weight requirements for prison guards held invalid); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (refusal to rehire civil rights activist). 
37. 401 U.S. at 436. 
38. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
39. [d. at 136. 
40. Duke Power actively discriminated against blacks prior to the effective date of 
Title VII (July 2, 1965) at which time the company no longer required blacks to remain 
in the lowest-paying jobs. But, at the same time, the employer instituted the challenged 
diploma and test requirements. These requirements, although applied equally to all em-
ployees, resulted in continued discrimination. 401 U.S. at 426-28. 
4l. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
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men applicants,42 The Dothard Court emphasized that the avail-
ability of less discriminatory alternatives which satisfy the legiti-
mate interests of the employer (business necessity) could 
sufficiently rebut that defense,4s 
C. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND MANDATORY MATERNITY 
LEAVES 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has 
been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to protect 
an individual's freedom of choice regarding marriage and procre-
ation against unwarranted governmental intrusion. 44 Restrictions 
placed upon pregnant employees, such as mandatory leaves of 
absence and denial of sick pay, obviously intrude in some way 
upon a woman's fundamental right to choose to bear a child. 
The issue of when such restrictions are sufficiently antagonistic 
to the woman's freedom of choice to be prohibited by the Consti-
tution was addressed by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur. 45 
In LaFleur, two pregnant teachers challenged a policy of the 
school board which required any teacher who became pregnant 
to take a mandatory maternity leave of absence, without pay, no 
later than five months prior to the expected date of birth of the 
child.48 The school board advanced two interests allegedly served 
by the mandatory maternity.leave: (1) continuity of classroom 
instruction requires a firm cut-off date to aid the school board in 
finding and hiring qualified substitutes; and (2) the physical in-
ability of some teachers in the more advanced stages of preg-
nancy to adequately perform their duties requires an early cut-
off date to protect the quality of instruction, as well as the 
health of the woman and her child.41 The Court struck down the 
mandatory maternity leave policy as violative of the due process 
clause, notwithstanding the validity of the asserted interests,48 
• 
42. [d. at 323-28. 
43. [d. at 329. 
44. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1945). . 
45. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
46. [d. at 635. 
47. [d. at 640-41. 
48. [d. at 639-48. 
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The Court found continuity of ciassroom instruction to be a 
legitimate interest,48 but the mandatory leave policy of the 
school board did nothing to serve this interest because only two 
weeks' notice was required by the policy, not giving the board 
much time to find a qualified substitute. Also, a cut-off date 
much later in pregnancy would certainly give the board a greater 
opportunity to find replacements with sufficient advance no-
tice.5O The Court held the early cut-off date to be wholly arbi-
trary, bearing no rational relationship to the interest of con-
tinuity of instruction. 51 
The Court also found the second reason asserted by the 
school board, the pregnant teacher's physical incapacities, to be 
a legitimate interest in the protection of both the teacher's 
health and the quality of instruction. 52 However, the Supreme 
Court held that the mandatory leave rules amounted to an im-
permissible irrebuttable presumption, in violation of due pro-
cess, that all pregnant teachers are incapable of continuing to 
work after the fourth month of pregnancy.53 Thus, the LaFleur 
Court enunciated two alternative tests to determine whether the 
mandatory leave rules violate due process: (1) "the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that such rules 
must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon 
this vital area of a teacher's Constitutional libertY,"54 or (2) if 
the rule creates an irrebuttable presumption which is neither 
necessarily nor universally true, it violates the due process 
clause.55 
Justice Powell concurred in the result reached by the Court 
in LaFleur but felt that an equal protection, rather than due 
process, analysis was appropriate.58 Without deciding whether 
the regulations of the school board constituted sex or disability 
classifications, or whether a sex-based classification would re-
• 
49. [d. at 641. 
50. [d. at 642-43. 
51. [d. at 643. "In fact, since the fifth ... month of pregnancy will obviously begin 
at different times in the school year for different teachers, the present. . . rules serve to 
hinder attaipment of the very continuity objectives that they are purportedly designed to 
promote." [d. 
52. [d. at 643-44. 
53. [d. at 644-45. 
54. [d. at 640. 
55. [d. at 646. 
56. [d. at 651 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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quire strict scrutiny, Justice Powell found that the challenged 
rules did not meet even a rational basis test. 57 Although the 
school board did articulate legitimate state interests, Justice 
Powell agreed with the Court in concluding that there was no 
showing that these interests were rationally furthered by the 
challenged rules.58 
It is important to note that LaFleur arose prior to the Title 
VII amendment extending the reach of the statute to include 
state agencies and educational institutions.58 Although a major-
ity of the Supreme Court has not yet declared sex to be a suspect 
classification subject to strict scrutiny, 80 and it is not clear that 
rules relating to pregnancy necessarily involve sex-based classifi-
cations,61 Title VII appears to require an analysis comparable to 
the traditional strict scrutiny equal protection analysis.82 In ad-
dition, the statute, as amended in 1978, declares that classifica-
tions made on the basis of pregnancy are, for purposes of the 
statute, classifications made on the basis of sex.83 
D. THE deLaurier Opinion 
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion of deLaurier's claims 
with an analysis of the school district's policy of mandatory 
leave of absence under Title VII. The court agreed that a prima 
57. [d. at 653 n.2. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. at 656 n.6. 
60. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate level of scrutiny for 
sex classifications); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (four Justices concluded 
in the plurality opinion that classifications on the basis of sex are suspect). 
61. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (not gender-based discrimina-
tion); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 653 n.2 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring, stating that the issue need not be decided). 
62. A strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause typically requires a 
determination that 1) the challenged policy burdens a suspect class or infringes upon a 
fundamental right; 2) once this is determined, the policy is presumed to be' unconstitu-
tional unless the government can show a compelling interest; and 3) the policy must 
constitute the least restrictive means available. H. CHASE AND C. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 62 (2d ed. 1979). 
A Title VII analysis similarly involves 1) a determination that the classification 
made by the challenged policy is prohibited by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, for ex-
ample, makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2) The employer is then given the opportunity to 
show that the policy is required as a business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. at 431. 3) The policy may still be prohibited by Title vn if less discriminatory 
alternatives are available. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 329. 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). See note 29 supra. 
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facie case of discrimination was presented84 and concluded that 
the district court findings regarding business necessity were not 
clearly erroneous.eo The court then distinguished the challenged 
leave policy from that of Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur88 and found that the policy was neither arbitrary nor did it 
constitute an impermissible irrebuttable presumption in viola-
tion of the due process clause.87 Finally, the court determined 
that the denial of accumulated sick leave benefits showed a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Title VIl88 and re-
manded that issue to the district court to provide the school dis-
trict with an opportunity to show business necessity in defense of 
its policy. 88 
Title VII Claim 
The Ninth Circuit had no difficulty finding that since 
"mandatory maternity leave is not the withholding of a potential 
benefit, but is a restriction on pregnant women's employment 
opportunities, it follows that such a policy does constitute a gen-
der-based discrimination."70 Following the "additional burden" 
analysis of Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 71 as opposed to a finding of 
"additional benefit" of Geduldig v. Aiello72 and General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert,73 the deLaurier court agreed that the policy was a 
prima facie violation of Title VIT, and proceeded to discuss the 
defense of business necessity presented by the school district. 
The district court found the mandatory leave policy to be 
justifiable as a business necessity.74 In its findings of fact, the 
64. 588 F.2d at 676. 
65. [d. at 681. 
66. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
67. 588 F.2d at 682-83. 
68. [d. at 684. 
69. [d. at 685. Recent amendments, not applicable to deLaurier, to Title VII and 
California Education Code render unnecessary further discussion of the issue of sick leave 
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (relevant text is reproduced at note 29 supra) was added to 
Title VII on October 31, 1978 and effectively overruled Gilbert by declaring that preg-
nancy shall be treated, for all employment purposes, the same as other disabilities. In 
addition, while deLaurier was pending appeal, the California legislature amended the 
Education Code to the effect that sick leave benefits may be used during pregnancy 
leave. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44978 (West 1976). 
70. 588 F.2d at 677. 
71. 434 U.S. at 351. 
72. 417 U.S. 484. 
73. 429 U.S. 125. 
74. 588 F.2d at 678. 
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district court had enumerated four reasons for upholding the ne-
cessity of the policy: (1) health of the mother and child; (2) de-
clining ability to perform; (3) the need for qualified substitutes; 
and (4) the need for sufficient lead time to find qualified substi-
tutes and a date certain for such substitutes to commence em-
ployment.75 The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court 
had applied the correct legal standard regarding the business ne-
cessity defense, and restricted further analysis to the issue of 
whether the findings were clearly erroneous.78 
The Ninth Circuit divided the district court's findings into 
two groups and determined that the business necessity defense 
was supported alternatively by the first set of goals, relating to 
administrative and educational needs,77 or the second, relating to 
the physical condition of the teacher. 78 The deLaurier court did 
not correctly apply the standards set out by the Supreme Court 
in Griggs1t and Do thard , 80 in that no showing was made that any 
of the valid goals presented by the school district were furthered 
by the mandatory leave policy. As Judge Hufstedler pointed out 
in a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, although the 
business necessity defense is available in a broad range of Title 
vn cases, the defense is difficult to establish and 
is a highly restrictive and carefully limited de-
fense . . . . The defense cannot be established 
merely by a showing that it is administratively 
convenient to the employer, or even by a showing 
that other practices would be highly inconvenient. 
The employer must show that the practice in 
question is specifically required for the operation 
of the business.sl 
Specifically, the school district offered no evidence either to show 
that the mandatory maternity leave commencing at the begin-
ning of the ninth month of pregnancy was required to further the 
goals of finding qualified substitute teachers and protecting the 
75. 1d. at 678·79 n.8. 
76. 1d. at 679. 
77. 1d. at 680. 
78.1d. 
79. 401 U.S. at 436. The policy must "measure the person for the job." 
BO. 433 U.S. at 332 n.14. The policy must be "necessary to safe and efficient job 
performance." 
81. 588 F.2d at 687 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted). 
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health of the mother and child or that teachers who were nine 
months pregnant could not adequately perform their duties.82 
Regarding the administrative goals, it is obviously convenient to 
have a date certain in order to hire a substitute for the pregnant 
teacher. It is equally convenient to have a date certain in order 
to hire a substitute for any other teacher who must take an ex-
tended leave of absence. Yet, according to the school district's 
policy, only pregnant teachers were required to give advance no-
tification. There was no showing that there was a need for such 
disparate treatment, and further, there was no showing that the 
administrative goals would not have been served equally well by 
allowing the individual teacher to determine at what date her 
leave would begin, as long as sufficient advance notice were 
given.83 
The court relied on medical testimony, which indicated that 
it is impossible to accurately predict the date a child will be 
born, to uphold the district's ninth-month rule as necessary to 
further the administrative goal of having a date certain.84 How-
ever, Judge Hufstedler, in her dissent, broke down the statistical 
evidence as presented by the medical experts and found that in 
the year in which Karen deLaurier was pregnant only one or two 
pregnant teachers in the San Diego school district who desired to 
teach later than the beginning of the ninth month of pregnancy 
"would be likely to give birth before one week prior to their pre-
dicted delivery date."85 This set of facts could hardly justify the 
requirement that all pregnant teachers must take a mandatory 
leave of absence four weeks prior to the earliest expected delivery 
date as a business necessity. 
The deLaurier court found that the leave policy could alter-
natively be upheld as a business necessity due to the physical 
condition of pregnant teachers during the ninth month.88 Again, 
there was no showing that teachers in the ninth month of preg-
nancy are unable to perform their duties or that unusual compli-
cations of pregnancy are more likely to occur in the ninth month 
82. [d. at 688. 
83. [d. Indeed, the California legislature has amended the Education Code so that 
the decision as to when maternity leave should commence is now to be made by the 
individual teacher and her physician. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44965 (West 1976). 
84. 588 F.2d at 680. 
85. [d. at 688. 
86. [d. at 680. 
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than at earlier stages of pregnancy. Nor was there any evidence 
that complications were more likely to occur among women who 
continued teaching than pregnant women generally.87 As Judge 
Hufstedler correctly concluded, the district court's findings re-
garding the physical condition of the teacher were clearly 
erroneous.88 
Even assuming that the school district's policy was justified, 
either by its need for a date certain or its concern for the health 
of mother and child, the evidence presented in deLaurier showed 
that a less restrictive alternative-the third step of the McDon-
nelllDothard test-was available. Nothing in the evidence, as 
disclosed by the opinions of Judges Wallace or Hufstedler, 
showed that a cut-off date one week prior to the expected deliv-
ery or any other date chosen by the individual teacher and her 
physician would not further the legitimate interests of the school 
district. Thus, the deLaurier court failed to apply the correct 
standard by disregarding the third step to rebut the business ne-
cessity defense. 
The Fourteenth Amendment Claim 
Relying on dicta of the Supreme Court's opinion in Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaFleur,88 the Ninth Circuit held 
that the school district's mandatory ninth-month leave policy 
was neither arbitrary nor grounded upon an impermissible ir-
rebuttable presumption.so The Ninth Circuit distinguished La-
Fleur on the basis of medical testimony regarding the inaccuracy 
of prediction of the expected delivery date81 and found that "it is 
wholly rational for the district to terminate the teacher's free-
dom of choice at just that point where the unpredictability of 
pregnancy is most likely to come into play."82 However, in dis-
cussing the same interests of continuity of education and admin-
istrative convenience as those asserted in deLaurier, the LaFleur 
Court noted: "Indeed, continuity would seem just as well at-
tained if the teacher herself were allowed to choose the date 
87. [d. at 689. 
88. [d. at 690. 
89. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
90. 588 F.2d at 683. The LaFleur Court found that the policy before it, which re-
quired the leave of absence to begin at the fifth month of pregnancy, was arbitrary and 
wholly unrelated to the interests asserted by the school district. 414 U.S. at 639-43. 
91. See text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra. 
92. 588 F.2d at 682. 
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upon which to commence her leave, at least so long as the deci-
sion were required to be made and notice given of it well in ad-
vance of the date selected.",a The LaFleur Court, addressing the 
problem of unpredictability, implied that any mandatory cut-off 
date treating maternity unlike other disabilities might violate 
due process. 
It is, of course, possible that either premature 
childbirth or complications in the latter stages of 
pregnancy might upset even the most careful 
plans of the teacher, the substitute, and the 
school board. But there is nothing in these records 
to indicate that such emergencies could not be 
handled, as are all others, through the normal use 
of the emergency substitute teacher process.v• 
In short, although the challenged policy in de Laurier was 
not as restrictive as the policy held to violate due process in La-
Fleur, the asserted interests and the restrictions placed upon 
pregnant teachers in both cases are sufficiently similar to con-
clude that, according to the Supreme Court's reasoning, both 
policies are equally violative of due process. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the Title VII challenge to the 
mandatory leave policy was incomplete. The court considered 
the first step required by McDonnell and found a prima facie 
case of discrimination. The coUrt then determined that the sec-
ond step of the McDonnell test was met. In so doing, the court 
did not correctly analyze the business necessity defense. It failed 
to show any correlation between the admittedly valid interests 
asserted by the school district and the policy established to fur-
ther those interests. Then, the court failed to consider less re-
strictive alternatives to the challenged policy, as required by Mc-
Donnell and Dothard to rebut the business necessity defense. 
Because of the recent amendments to the California Education 
Code, the deLaurier decision is not likely to have any serious ef-
fect on pregnant teachers in California. However, since Title VII 
reaches many more situations of employment discrimination 
than mandatory maternity leaves for teachers, the flawed reason-
93. 414 U.S. at 642. 
94. 1d. at 642 n.lO (citation omitted). 
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ing of the court may adversely affect women in other jobs, and 
any workers with a Title vn dispute in the Ninth Circuit. 
Maxine Salzman 
. m. TITLE vn RIGHTS OF HOMOSEXUALS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., Inc., I 
the Ninth Circuit firmly shut the door to potential Title vn2 and 
Section 1985(3)3 protections for homosexuals. In this case plain-
tiffs consolidated three appeals and alleged that their respective 
employers discriminated against them in employment decisions 
because of their homosexuality} In two cases plaintiffs had filed 
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
1. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. May, 1979) (per Choy, J.; Sneed, J., filed a concurring and 
dissenting opinion; Bonsai, D.J., was the third panel member). 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) provides 
in pertinent part: 
It sha1\ be unlawful employment practice for an employer ... 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual ... because of 
such individual's ... sex. 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976) states in pertinent part: 
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of 
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privilege 
and immunities under the law ... the party so injured or 
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occa-
sioned by such injury or deprivation, against anyone or more 
of the conspirators. 
4. Plaintiffs brought this appeal to the Ninth Circuit through a consolidation of three 
cases: 
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc.: three homosexuals a1\eged impermissible 
discrimination; one claimed that he was not hired because a PT&T supervisor concluded 
that he was a homosexual and the other two claimed they were forced to quit their 
employment after being harassed by fe1\ow workers and their supervisors. Plaintiffs filed 
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which were re-
jected for lack of jurisdiction over claims of discrimination because of sexual orientation. 
Plaintiffs then sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief under Title VII and 
§ 1985(c), as we1\ as mandamus instructing the EEOC to process charges based upon sex-
ual orientation. 
Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc.: a male homosexual a1\eged discrimina-
tion when he was fired after two years of service as a teacher because he wore a sma1\ gold 
ear loop to school. Plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC which were rejected I,Ind sought 
declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. 
Lundin v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc.: two female homosexuals claimed they were 
fired due to their known lesbian relationship. Plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive 
relief. 
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(EEOC) which were rejected for lack of jurisdiction over claims 
of discrimination due to sexual orientation. In all three cases 
plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The 
district courts in each case dismissed the complaints for failure 
to state a cause of actionS under the statutes. 
B. TITLE vn CLAIM-CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Plaintiffs claimed that Title VII should be interpreted to 
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of a person's 
sexual orientation. They argued that Congress, in formulating 
Title VII to prohibit sex discrimination in employment decisions, 
intended to include protection for sexual preferences as well as 
protection from gender-based discrimination. Plaintiffs con-
tended that the district courts erred in dismissing their com-
plaints for failing to state claims under the statute. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, thereby rejecting plaintiffs' argument that Title 
VII protections include sexual preference. 
The court relied upon its earlier holding in Holloway v. Ar-
thur Anderson & CO.,8 in which the Ninth Circuit held that Title 
vn protections do not extend to transsexuals. In Holloway, the 
court found that Congress had not shown any intent to extend the 
term "sex" to other than its traditional meaning of gender. The 
court found that the sex discrimination provisions of the statute 
were limited and were only intended "to place women on an equal 
footing with men."7 The court also noted that Congress, in subse-
quent legislative sessions, failed to adopt proposed amendments 
concerning sexual preference, making this refusal to broaden the 
term "sex" evident.s Based upon the findings of Holloway, the 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5) allows dismissal upon motion that the pleadings fail to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs were, therefore, foreclosed from 
proving their case upon the merits. 
6. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). See Note, Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, Ninth 
Circuit Survey, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 100 (1979). 
7. 566 F.2d at 662. The court in Holloway stated: 
[d. at 663. 
Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the 
term "sex" to its traditional meaning. Therefore, this court will 
not expand Title VII's application in the absence of Congres-
sional mandate. The manifest purpose of Title VII's prohibition 
against sex discrimination in employment is to ensure that men 
and women are treated equally, absent a bona fide relationship 
between the qualifications for the job and the person's sex. 
8. [d. at 662. These three bills were: H.R. 5452, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 
2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 121 CONGo REc. 
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Ninth Circuit concluded "that Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' dis-
crimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender 
and should not be judicially extended to include sexual prefer-
ence such as homosexuality."8 
The court further used this denial of Title VII protections to 
dismiss additional claims. One claim involved being fired due to 
effeminacy, the employer relying upon a stereotype that male 
teachers should have a virile appearance. IO Another claim alleged 
an impermissible interference with employees' rights of associa-
tion due to discrimination against employees having homosexual 
relationships with certain friends. II Both claims were found lack-
ing due to the absence of protection afforded to homosexuals by 
Title VII. 
Similarly, the court rejected the allegation that discrimina-
tion based upon sexual preference repreE!ents impermissible use 
of different employment criteria for men and women as prohib-
ited by the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 12 
An employer using such a policy, reasoned the Ninth Circuit, 
whether dealing with men or women is using the same criterion, 
namely, the preference of an employee for sexual partners of the 
same sex. 
Disproportionate Impact 
Plaintiffs also argued that homosexual discrimination falls 
within Title VII protections based upon recent decisions concern-
ing disproportionate impact of facially neutral criteria. 13 Under 
8548 (1975). (remarks of Mr. Koch). See Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Center, 403 
F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in 
Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 495, 502-03 (1976). 
9. 608 F.2d at 331-32. 
10. The court rejected plaintiffs contention that being fired due to an effeminate 
appearance violated Title VII. [d. at 332. Relying upon the Holloway finding of protection 
only for gender-based discrimination, the DeSantis panel agreed with the Fifth Circuit 
holding that discrimination because of effeminacy is not protected by Title VII. [d., 
citing Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978). 
11. Plaintiffs sought to draw an analogy to holdings ofthe EEOC that discrimination 
due to the race of employees' friends may constitute a violation of Title VII. See EEOC 
Dec. No. 71-1902, [1973] EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ~6281; EEOC Dec. No. 71-969, 
[1972] EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ~6193. The allegation was rejected due to the holding 
that homosexual relationships are not protected under Title VII. 
12. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
13. Facially neutral actions (actions not discriminatory in form) may produce effects 
that adversely and disproportionately weigh upon members of particular protected groups 
of individuals. Such actions will require explanation in terms of non-invidious purposes. 
This theory of facially neutral discrimination has been developed by the United States 
29
Salzman and Chew: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
56 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:27 
cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 14 discrimination against 
homosexuals could be proven in trial to have a disproportionate 
effect upon men, thus making it an impermissible classification 
affecting one sex more than the other .15 Plaintiffs claimed this 
disproportionate impact upon men results from the greater incid-
ence of homosexuality amongst men and the greater likelihood of 
discovering a male's homosexuality as compared to a female's 
homosexuality. 
A majority of the court rejected this extension of Title VII 
through a disproportionate impact analysis. 1ft The DeSantis ma-
jority contended that the Supreme Court in Griggs sought to 
effectuate the major congressional purpose of Title VII of protect-
ing blacks from employment discrimination. Since Congress re-
peatedly refused to adopt legislation to extend such protection to 
sexual orientation, the majority refused "to 'bootstrap' Title VII 
protection to homosexuals under the guise of protecting men gen-
erally. "17 
Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976). See Note, Discrimination: Facially 
Neutral Action, Ninth Circuit Survey, 10 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 60 (1980). 
14. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
15. Plaintiffs quoted from Griggs: "What is required by Congress (under Title VII) 
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classifications." 401 U.S. at 431. 
16. But see Blake v. Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) where the Ninth 
Circuit found that Title VII could be utilized under a Griggs impact analysis to show a 
violation of sex discrimination in employment by a public employer in a case involving 
alleged discrimination against women by the Los Angeles Police Department. The court 
held that Congress expressly provided that Title vn was to apply to state and local 
governments and intended that the Griggs impact standard would apply through a mere 
showing of disproportionate impact on a protected group. Invidious intent need not be 
shown. The disproportionate impact of different height and weight requirements on 
women was found to be sufficient to make a prima facie showing of sex discrimination, as 
was the total exclusion of women from regular patrol work. Once this showing is made, 
the employer must meet a burden of justifying the employment practice. The defendant 
failed to show sufficient business necessity in following its discriminatory policies. The 
case was remanded to the district court for trial, overturning the lower court decision of 
summary judgment for defendants. 
17. 608 F.2d at 331. The dissent differed on the matter of Griggs disproportionate 
impact theory. Although the dissent agreed that Title VII does not extend protection from 
employment discrimination to homosexuals, the dissent would have allowed plaintiffs to 
try their case on the merits and not dismiss this issue on the pleadings. 
The dissent interpreted the issue raised to be that homosexuality represents a facially 
neutral criterion that may impact disproportionately on males due to the greater visibility 
of male homosexuals and higher incidence of male homosexuality. The use of such a claim 
is not just an attempt to "bootstrap" Title VII protection to homosexuals, but rather, is 
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C. THE SECTION 1985 CLAIM 
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants engaged in a conspiracy 
in violation of section 1985(c)18 to deny them equal protection of 
the law through concerted actions by various agents of their em-
ployers to effectuate discriminatory policies against homosexuals. 
The court, however, in support of its holding that section 1985(c) 
is inapplicable to homosexual discrimination claims, relied upon 
Griffin u. Breckenridge,19 which held that there must be "some 
racial or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discrimina-
tory animus behind conspirator's action."20 Since homosexuality 
is not a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classification, terms which 
have been applied to race and gender to require more exacting 
scrutiny, the court reasoned that homosexuals are not within the 
ambit of section 1985(c). 
D. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO TITLE vn PROTECTION 
It is clear that protections from employment discrimination 
due to sexual preference will not be extended by the Ninth Circuit 
based on congressional intent in enacting Title VII. Although 
DeSantis and Holloway were not unanimous decisions, all mem-
bers of the respective panels agreed that the intent of Title vn 
was to limit protection from sex-based employment discrimina-
tion to gender. Support for this holding exists in one other circuit 
at this time. 21 Additionally, commentators have also noted the 
lack of intent by Congress to ban employment discrimination 
based on homosexuality through Title vn.22 
This holding is essentially the only interpretation possible of 
a claim that may be ·shown to· protect men in general. [d. at 333. 
18. For the relevant statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), see note 3 supra. 
19. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
20. [d. at 102. 
21. The Fifth Circuit has also held in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 
(5th Cir. 1978) that Title VII does not protect homosexuals, thus refusing, as the Ninth 
Circuit has in DeSantis, to extend the prohibition of sexual discrimination without Con-
gressional mandate. 
22. As noted in Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimina-
tion in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1979), Congress, 
in discussing the Title VII provision relating to sex, religion and national origin discrimi-
nation did not entertain the notion that the statute might be raised in subsequent sexual 
preference discrimination cases. The author comments: "[AJny forthright analysis must 
recognize that most of the alternative approaches are simply efforts at ascertaining what 
Congress would, or should, have said with respect to sexual preference classifications had 
it confronted that subject." [d. at 564. See also Siniscalco, supra note 8. 
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Congressional intent in enacting Title VII. It is clear that Title 
vn was intended to be limited in application to discrimination 
due to "sex" in its traditional meaning, that is, to gender-based 
discrimination. To extend protections from Title VII, as plaintiffs 
suggest, would be clearly an exercise in judicial legislation. The 
proper forum for such attempts to produce statutory protections 
is with Congress and not the judiciary. 
The dissent23 recognized a possible means for protecting 
against sexual preference employment discrimination. Under a 
theory of disproportionate impact against men as a class, a fa-
cially neutral criterion might result in a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 24 The court may 
have been too hasty in dismissing, out of hand, the issue of fa-
cially neutral discrimination. Plaintiffs should, as the dissent 
suggested, be allowed to show discrimination against men as a 
class as a result of homosexual discrimination. In this developing 
area of equal protection law, by deciding this case on the merits 
upon a disproportionate impact theory, the Ninth Circuit would 
have taken a step in determining the extent to which remedies 
exist for discrimination against a gender-class from discrimina-
tion which stems from characteristics of individuals within that 
class. 
Another means of establishing such protection in private 
employment would be to extend those protections now existing 
within the public sector25 by establishing the employer as "quasi-
governmental."28 Also, one might attempt to classify the activity 
23. See note 17 supra. 
24. To prevail on a cause of action based on disproportionate impact requires a 
showing that males are discriminated against to the benefit of females due to the facially 
neutral criterion of homosexuality. Just as Griggs effectuated the congressional purpose 
of Title VII in protecting blacks from employment discrimination, the intent of protecting 
men as a class may be extended here. In this way it would be necessary to satisfy at least 
the intermediate level of scrutiny afforded to gender which would require meeting a 
substantial relationship test. Although it may be difficult to show, plaintiffs could point 
to factors such as greater statistical incidence of male homosexuality, greater likelihood 
of discovering a male's homosexual preference due to official documentation in military 
and arrest records, and the greater stigma associated with male as compared to female 
homosexuality. 
25. See Friedman, supra note 22. 
26. The California Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, granted equal protec-
tion guarantees of freedom from employment discrimination to homosexuals employed by 
public utilities. Gay Law Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 
P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979). The California court drew an analogy between public 
utilities and governmental entities because of their exclusive monopolistic franchises 
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of the employer as "state action"27 under the fourteenth amend-
ment where a relationship exists between the private employer 
and government through funding, government contracts, or srmi-
lar ties. In this way, where a substantial relationship between a 
private employer and the government is shown, the discrimina-
tory action would have to survive rational basis scrutiny or be 
found unconstitutional. Although this level of scrutiny is rela-
tively easy to satisfy, in the event that intermediate or strict level 
of scrutiny would be found to apply to homosexuals, this means 
of analysis may partially extend public sector protections into the 
private sector. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The establishment of protection from employment discrimi-
nation for homosexuals will necessarily come from furtherance of 
constitutional protections or legislation which explicitly covers 
discrimination against homosexuals. DeSantis foreclosed any at-
tempts to extend these protections from Title VII. 
Wayne B. Chew 
granted and protected by the state. There is no "state action" requirement in the Califor-
nia Constitution, which reads in pertinent part: "A person may not be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws." CAL. 
CONST., Art. I, Sec. 7, sub. (a). Thus, the California court could extend to public utilities 
the obligation not to employ arbitrary employment discrimination against any class of 
individuals. Since the state may not exclude homosexuals as a class from employment 
opportunities without a showing that a person's homosexuality renders that person unfit 
for the job, Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375,82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969), 
this decision places public utilities under this obligation as well. 
The California Supreme Court held that protection from homosexual employment 
discrimination was afforded by statutes also. CAL. PUB. UTlL. CODE § 453 (West Supp. 
1979) was found to ban arbitrary employment discrimination against homosexuals by a 
public utility and CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101 and 1102 (West Supp. 1979) were held to protect 
homosexuals from employment discrimination due to their "political activity." 24 Cal. 3d 
458, 475-89, 595 P.2d 592, 602-11, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24-33. 
27. Such state action may be alleged through a) assumption of state functions or 
powers by a private party, b) state aid to privately initiated activity, c) a partnership or 
agency relationship between private parties and state, and d) private party action subject 
to state regulatory schemes. See generally, McCoy, Current State Action Theories, the 
Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided 
Institutions, 31 VAND. L. REV. 785 (1978); Nevin, State Action: The Significant State 
Inuoluement Doctrine after Moose Lodge and Jackson, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 647 (1978); Note, 
State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Priuate Actiuity, 74 
COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974). 
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IV. DISCRIMINATION: FACIALLY NEUTRAL ACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In a potentially far-reaching decision, the Ninth Circuit in 
De La Cruz v. Tormey, I reversed a dismissal upon the complaint 
of an action concerning the lack of campus child care facilities in 
a community college district. The plaintiffs, young women with 
low incomes, faced with burdens of child rearing, alleged that the 
continued denial of child care facilities by the community college 
district deprived them of equal educational opportunity.2 The 
district court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that 
it failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted on 
a motion by the defendants: the Board of Trustees, the Chancel-
lor, and the Presidents of the three colleges comprising the San 
Mateo Community College District. The question before the 
Ninth Circuit was the sufficiency of the pleadings for a trial upon 
the merits.3 
The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had stated a 
claim of discrimination entitling them to an opportunity to dem-
onstrate proof of their allegations. In remanding the case to the 
district court, the Ninth Circuit expressed no views concerning 
the merits of the claims made, deciding only that the case could 
not be resolved upon construction of the pleadings. 
De La Cruz presented the Ninth Circuit with two significant 
issues: the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint under both 
Title IX and the fourteenth amendment, and their standing to 
sue. The plaintiffs' claimed a violation under Title IX of the 
1. 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. Sept. 1978) (per Palmieri, D.J., sitting by designation; Wal-
lace, J., dissenting; the other panel member was Kilkenny, J.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
965 (1979). 
2. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that defendants acted illegally and uncon-
stitutionally, and temporary and permanent injunctions restraining defendants from 
maintaining their allegedly discriminatory "anti-child-care" policy and requiring them to 
take affirmative steps to develop child care centers in the Community College District. 
3. In stating the issue and outlining the task before it, the court stated: 
The issue is not whether a plaintiffs success on the merits is 
likely but rather whether the claimant is entitled to proceed 
beyond the threRhold in attempting to establish his 
claims .... We must determine whether or not it appears to 
a certainty under existing law that no relief can be granted 
under any set of facts that might be proved in support of plain-
tiffs claims. 
582 F.2d at 48. 
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Education Act Amendments of 1972.· They alleged an infringe-
. ment of their rights to be free from sexual discrimination in edu-
cational programs receiving federal funds. Plaintiffs also claimed 
that the defendants' actions constituted intentional, invidious 
gender-based discrimination which was arbitrary and totally un-
related to the legitimate goal of providing education, thus violat-
ing their rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the Community 
College District arbitrarily maintained a policy of refusing to 
allow the establishment of child care centers, refusing to expend 
District funds or accept or apply for funds to establish or main-
tain child care facilities on any of its'. three campuses. Despite 
studies and surveys clearly reflecting the need for such facilities, 
the Community College District refused to take any action.5 
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 
There are two fundamentally different ways in which govern-
mental actions may constitute invidious discrimination in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
The first, often termed "facially discriminatory" action, occurs 
when there is an explicit classification of persons by reference to 
criteria such as race, sex, religion or ancestry. Such improper 
bases for differentiation, when legitimate governmental objec-
tives are not substantially furthered, are unlawful. 
Facially Neutral Action 
The second way in which a violation may occur is more sub-
tle, as it focuses upon the results of the action rather than the 
form of the action. Such actions, while not discriminatory in form 
(facially neutral), may produce effects that adversely and dispro-
portionately weigh upon members of particular protected groups 
of individuals and will require explanation in terms of non-
invidious purposes. 
4. 20 u.s.c. § 1681 (1976) (hereinafter Title IX). Title IX provides, in pertinent part: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any educational 
program or activity receiving Federal financing assistance." 
5. Plaintiffs further alleged: "The District would not have been required to spend any 
of its own funds, nor to donate any of its own facilities as private sources could have 
provided the required matching funds and locations for the centers." 582 F.2d at 49. 
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This theory of facially neutral discrimination, as developed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis" and 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 7 requires proof of two essential elements: discrimina-
tory effect and invidious discriminatory intent or purpose.K Un-
less disproportionate impact is shown to be the product of inten-
tional discrimination by an official, the government action will 
not be subject to strict scrutiny and the government will not be 
required to show compelling state interest. The requirement of 
proof of these two elements severely restricts the ability of a court 
to find a suspect classification and therefore find unacceptable 
discrimination. It greatly decreases the likelihood of invalidating 
such facially neutral government action.9 
The De La Cruz Holding 
De La Cruz is noteworthy in that the Ninth Circuit found 
sufficient allegations in the pleadings for both discriminatory 
impact or effect and discriminatory purpose requirements. The 
Ninth Circuit analyzed a series of cases decided by the Supreme 
CourtlO and determined that the cases demonstrate that the term 
6. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
7. 429 U.S. 252 (1976). 
8. In discussing and reaffirming their holding in Washington v. Davis, the United 
States Supreme Court in Arlington Heights stated it was 
clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in racially disproportionate impact. Dispro· 
portionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the whole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination. Proof of ra· 
cially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
429 U.S. at 264·65. See also, Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and 
Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961; 
Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: 
Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburg, 12 HARV. C.R.· 
C.L.L. REv. 725 (1977). 
9. For a discussion of the Washington test versus a pure impact test and a suggested 
"causation principle," see Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theo· 
ries of Constitutional Adjudication. 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36 (1977). In this article the author 
argues that the Washington impact test, as formulated by the United States Supreme 
Court is too narrow, allowing heightened scrutiny of government acts only where there is 
a showing of intentional discrimination. The author proposes that equal protection should 
require special scrutiny wherever such disproportionate impact is reasonably attributable 
to race or other suspect classifications regardless of motive. 
10. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (complainants established a prima 
facie case of gender. based discrimination through the use of facially neutral height and 
weight employment standards resulting in disproportionate impact upon women appli· 
cants); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (exclusion of black applicants from employ. 
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discriminatory impact only serves to describe disproportionate 
consequences of official action, and as such "operate[s] only to 
signal the beginning of analysis-an analysis which must ulti-
mately answer the question whether the effected discrimination 
is invidious and thus unlawful."l1 
Majority/Dissent Conflict Concerning Equal Protection 
Plaintiffs alleged in this case that the lack of child care facili-
ties deprived them of access to equal educational opportunities 
in the district in a way which almost exclusively burdens women. 
The majority found such allegations to be legally indistin-
guishable from the disproportionate impact and discriminatory 
effect of Lau v. Nichols 12 and Arlington Heights in that access to 
benefits was alleged to have been denied in a manner overwhelm-
ingly burdensome to a particular protected group. 
The dissent, however, distinguished Lau since the benefits 
sought there were part of a mandatory, imposed system of pri-
mary and secondary education. In this case, the college education 
sought by plaintiffs is not mandatory, nor as critical, so that the 
discriminatory burden alleged here was not imposed upon plain-
tiffs as it was in Lau. The majority conceded that although this 
must be a consideration in viewing the totality of defendants' 
conduct, it cannot form the basis of dismissal on the pleadings. 
Principally, the dissent would find no sufficient allegation of 
discriminatory effects in this case based upon the holdings of the 
United State Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello,13 General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,14 and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty.15 
ment in the District of Columbia police department caused by the use of a qualifying test 
found discriminatory); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (denial of housing and resulting employment opportunities through refusals to rezon~ 
for low and moderate income housing found discriminatory); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 
(1974) (failure to provide supplemental courses in English to non-English speaking stu-
dents, having the effect of depriving such students of an equal educational opportunity 
found discriminatory); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (established claim 
of discrimination due to disqualification of disproportionate numbers of blacks from em-
ployment or job transfer through requirements not shown to be related to successful job 
performance or legitimate business need). 
11. 582 F.2d at 52. 
12. 414 U.S. 563; see note 9, supra. 
13. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
14. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
15. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
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Geduldig is interpreted by the dissent to hold that invidious dis-
crimination is not evident where actions do "not single out any 
person or group for inferior treatment, but is merely less inclusive 
of benefits than some might desire."16 Moreover, the dissent 
would apply the holding of Gilbert: that no discriminatory effect 
may be found where no proof is shown that the package of bene-
fits is more valuable to men than to women. Discrimination, the 
dissent argues, is found only where the action imposes a burden 
upon one group not suffered by another group, as held in Sa tty. 
The dissent would find that no discriminatory effect exists where 
the relative value of included benefits offered to men are not 
shown to be greater than that offered to women. Therefore, the 
mere refusal to extend the additional benefits of child care facili-
ties to women would not be sufficient to show discriminatory 
effect in this case, reasons the dissent.17 
This analysis by the dissent reflects a conservative, construc-
tionist view of equal protection. Under such a view, particularly 
with facially neutral action, one is less likely to find discrimina-
tory effect. In contrast, the majority holding of this case is much 
more liberal in its interpretation of discriminatory effect and dis-
proportionate impact. 
16. 582 F.2d at 66 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
17. The dissent would also rely upon Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), as 
controlling, to support a contention that the inactivity of the Community College District, 
in declining to extend an additional benefit of disproportionate value to a group, is not 
actionable. The dissent finds the situation in Palmer analagous, in that the refusal to 
operate a swimming pool by the City of Jackson, Mississippi did not constitute a denial 
of equal protection. The dissent states: 
Although the decision of a government body not to initiate or 
support a particular social or economic program can certainly 
be said to have an effect or impact upon those who would be 
its beneficiaries, to say that such an effect or impact is discrim-
inatory merely because a certain group would have benefitted 
from it more than others is a quantum jump from the tradi-
tional understanding of discrimination. 
582 F.2d at 69 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
The majority on the other hand sees Palmer as not controlling the resolution of this 
case.ld. at 55-56 n.7. The primary question decided upon was whether illicit motivation 
alone could render otherwise valid official action constitutionally invalid. The majority 
notes that at no point in its opinion did the Supreme Court expressly confront or resolve 
the question whether refusal to extend benefits can be said to have a discriminatory effect. 
The majority would narrowly interpret Palmer to hold that invidious motivation alone wiJI 
not suffice to establish a constitutional violation and that no showing was made in that 
case concerning what state action would be considered discriminatory. ld. Therefore, 
Palmer is not seen as controJling in this case. 
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The majority, in rebutting the analysis by the dissent, distin-
guishes Geduldig and Gilbert from De La Cruz in that these cases 
did not proceed upon a theory of discriminatory effect, but rather, 
upon a theory of facial discrimination. This is due to the fact that 
disabilities resulting from pregnancy in Geduldig and Gilbert 
were so gender-specific as to make such distinctions discrimina-
tory on their face. The majority would read the holdings of these 
decisions in this limited context. 
Continuing with an analysis of Gilbert, the majority points 
out that although no attempt was made by respondents in Gilbert 
to meet the burden of demonstrating gender-based discrimina-
tory effect, the Court in Gilbert, in analyzing what would be 
sufficient to show discriminatory effect, stated that where "there 
is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men than to 
women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory 
effect simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do 
not receive benefits, or simply because an employer's disability 
plan is less than all-inclusive."ls The majority interprets this 
analysis to show "that a finding of discriminatory effect could be 
sustained where sufficient proof establishes that 'the package is 
in fact worth more to men than to women,' notwithstanding its 
facial neutrality and notwithstanding the circumstance that the 
challenged action took the form of a mere refusal to confer addi-
tional benefits. ".19 
Additionally, the majority finds that Satty is not inconsist-
ent with its' analysis of Geduldig and Gilbert. In Satty, the deter-
mination that respondents' failute to prove discriminatory effect 
of an action legally indistinguishable from that in Gilbert lends 
further credence to the analysis made here by the majority. lithe 
facially neutral action were immune to such proof, the determina-
tion made in Satty would be surplusage. 
18. 429 U.S. at 138·39. Congress has since specifically included disparate treatment 
due to pregnancy into the protections afforded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e·17 (1976) through its amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, Pub. L. 95·555, §1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), thus abrogating the specific holding of 
.Gilbert that exclusion of pregnancy from coverage of a disability benefits plan did not 
violate Title VII. This amendment prohibits all discriminatory treatment due to preg· 
nancy but does not require employers to treat pregnant women in any particular manner 
in employment. 
The statute does not affect the analysis as used in Gilbert, Geduldig, Satty or the 
present case. 
19. 582 F.2d at 55 n.6. 
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In light of the preceding analysis, the majority distinguishes 
these cases from the present facts: 
The benefits not granted or programs not offered 
in each of the above cases were not alleged to have 
been essential or even related to the enjoyment of 
benefits already conferred or programs already in 
existence .... [The actions] did not impair the 
value of the included coverages. Here, by contrast, 
the essence of plaintiff's grievance is that the ab-
sence of child care facilities renders the included 
benefits less valuable and less available to 
women; in other words, that the effect of the Dis-
trict's child care policy is to render the entire 
"package" of its educational programs of lesser 
worth to women than to men.:U 
By broadening the scope of the overall value of benefits to be 
considered in discriminatory effects analysis the majority is liber-
ally allowing proof of invidious discrimination beyond what was 
previously possible. This may be a step towards great liberaliza-
tion of equal protection attacks upon facially neutral actions re-
sulting in greater protection of constitutional rights. 
Full Evidentiary Record vs. Pleadings 
Aside from issues of discriminatory effects or invidious pur-
pose, the majority places great emphasis upon the fact that the 
dissent relied upon ~ases whose holdings are based upon rela-
tively full evidentiary records rather than upon mere construction 
of the pleadings as is the case here. As stated in Davis: "[A]n 
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the 
totality ofthe facts."21 It is necessary to determine whether invid-
ious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor through 
"sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of 
intent as may be available."22 The majority, therefore, finds it too 
early to dismiss this litigation based upon allegations of inten-
tional thwarting of all attempts to provide child care facilities by 
the defendants. This denial of child care facilities allegedly re-
sults in the effect of depriving substantial numbers of women 
from equal access to educational opportunities in violation of 
equal protection. Although no determination of the level of scru-
20. [d. at 56. 
21. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
22. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266. 
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tiny required is made, the court does indicate that upon a thresh-
old showing of discriminatory purpose on remand it would "be 
necessary to determine whether the injuries they claim may fairly 
be attributed to its improper consideration."23 
C. THE TITLE IX CLAIM 
The Title IX issue raised by the plaintiffs' pleadings involves 
the question of whether the Act provides plaintiffs with any pri-
vate right of action. The Ninth Circuit held a private right was 
available to the plaintiffs in De La Cruz. 
At the time De La Cruz was tried, the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit had concluded, in Cannon v. University of 
Chicago,24 that no private right of action existed. Cannon has 
since been overruled by the United States Supreme Court25 which 
held that a private right of action does exist under Title IX de-
spite the absence of any authorization in the statute. 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Seventh Circuit holding 
in Cannon, which held that the requisite state action ingredient 
was absent, defendants being a private university, from the 
facts in this case because of the clearly constituted state action 
alleged to have been taken by the Community College District. 
The Ninth Circuit came to this holding through the drawing 
of an analogy between Title IX and Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 196426 and the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
23. 582 F.2d at 59. This is to be determined through a test of "causation": 
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by 
a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have 
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof 
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of estab-
lishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the 
impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were estab-
lished, the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer 
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper con-
sideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, 
there would be no justification for judicial interference with the 
challenged decision. 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 270-71 n.21. 
24. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976). 
25. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), reading in part: "No person in the United States shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
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Lau v. Nichols. 27 Although the question of whether an implied 
right of action exists was not directly presented in Lau, 'the court 
noted that: "Given the close relationship between Title VI and 
Title IX and the Supreme Court's decision in Lau, we conclude 
it would be anomalous to deny plaintiffs here the right to raise 
asserted violations of Title IX.".28 Therefore, "[t]he abstract sim-
ilarities between the claims successfully urged in Lau and other 
cases and those alleged here are too striking to allow the dismissal 
of these claims to stand."29 
D. STANDING TO SUE 
The defendants challenged the four plaintiffs' standing to 
sue asserting that since three of the plaintiffs were presently stu-
dents in the District and the fourth a prospective high school 
graduate, no causal relationship existed between any action or 
policy of the District and the alleged lack of educational oppor-
tunities for the plaintiffs. The court, however, found that plain-
tiffs did have standing to sue as the plaintiffs' grievances had not 
become any less palpable or distinct to them because they were 
attending college or expected to go to college, nor did the fact that 
several had made temporary arrangements for the care of their 
children eliminate from the case the alleged burdens and uncer-
tainties they claimed to suffer as a result of the challenged policy. 
Plaintiffs had alleged a particularized injury, namely, the denial 
of their access to higher education which was asserted to have 
concretely and demonstrably resulted from defendants' actions, 
seeking redress by the remedy sought, thus meeting the require-
receiving Federal financial assistance." 
27. 414 U.S. 563. 
28. 582 F.2d at 60. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, based 
its holding upon an analysis of four factors in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975): 
(1) Whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a spe-
cial class of which plaintiff is a member; 
(2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to cre-
ate a private remedy; 
(3) whether implication of such a remedy is consistent with 
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme; 
(4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate be-
cause the subject matter involves an area basically of concern 
to the States. 
441 U.S. 688-89 n.9. See also Comment, Private Rights o{ Action Under Title IX, 13 MARV. 
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 425 (1978), 
29. 582 F.2d at 61. 
42
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/7
1980] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69 
ments of the Ninth Circuit for standing to sue as set forth in 
Bowkes u. Morton. 30 
E. CONCLUSION 
The De La Cruz holding is a narrow one concerning the suffi-
ciency of the pleadings. The court continually stressed that it was 
making no comment on the merits of the case. It may ultimately 
be shown that the dissent is correct concerning the final disposi-
tion of the litigation, but at this stage of the proceedings, plain-
tiffs must at least be allowed a trial on the merits. The signifi-
cance of the allegations involved would seem to indicate that the 
better view is to allow further proceedings, thus resulting in a fair 
disposition of the case upon a full consideration of the facts. 
The majority has' taken a bold step in distinguishing 
Geduldig, Gilbert and Satty. The dissent would hold no discrimi-
natory effect due to an equality of value of existing benefits, but 
the majority significantly broadens the valuation of benefits by 
also considering the effect of the further burden of child rearing 
imposed due to the refusal to allow the establishment of child 
care centers. It is the overall value of the "package" of benefits 
that the majority focuses upon. Albeit, upon the surface the value 
of benefits to both men and women are equal, deeper analysis will 
demonstrate that the value of benefits to women is illusory due 
to the fact that these benefits are effectively excluded through the 
denial of child care facilities. 
If followed by other courts, this concept could,greatly affect 
the entire area of equal protection. The liberal approach used in 
the analysis by the Ninth Circuit in the majority opinion is rea-
sonable since to follow the more conservative approach advocated 
by the dissent would only blind one's self to the realities of the 
actual opportunity of women to enjoy the benefits available. The 
majority would simply recognize the overall, effective value of the 
benefits in light of ancillary burdens and recognize any resultant 
discriminatory effect. The dissenting view would not; simply 
stops its analysis at the surface benefits conferred. 
Both the majority and the dissent discuss the role of' the 
judiciary in reviewing such actions as alleged here. 31 The views of 
30. 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976). 
31. As stated by the majority, they have fulfilled "the proper role of the federal 
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both are reconcilable although their results differ in this case. The 
dissent would not intervene where only discriminatory intent is 
alleged, assuming, as developed in the dissenting opinion, that 
discriminatory effects have not been adequately alleged.32 But the 
dissent also states: "[O]nly after discriminatory effects are 
shown. . . intent becomes relevant to the validity of a legislative 
or administrative act. "33 The majority would also normally "show 
great deference to local democratic processes and refrain in most 
instances from interfering with decisions of school authorities."34 
But as the court recites from Arlington Heights,35 there are times 
judiciary in overseeing the decisions of local administrative bodies in the field of public 
education." 582 F.2d at 47. 
The Ninth Circuit took this same role in Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe 
Elementary School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978). Here the Ninth Circuit held that 
failure to provide bi-lingual education to elementary school students of Mexican-
American and Yaqui Indian origin did not violate equal protection. 
As the Ninth Circuit points out, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1978). The state action of defendants to 
cure these language deficiencies was held to be rationally related to legitimate state 
interests since it did not fail "to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire basic 
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation 
in the political process." 582 F .2d at 37. 
The court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does 
not impose a duty to provide bilingual-bicultural education as sought by the plaintiffs. 
The programs initiated by the school district to cure existing language deficiencies of these 
non-English speaking students was held to have fulfilled defendant's equal protection 
duty. 
Additionally, the court held that bilingual-bicultural education is not required by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), as the remedial education provided 
already complies with making available meaningful education and equality of educational 
opportunities. The Equal Education Opportunity Act of the Education Amendments of 
1974, Section 204, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976), also would not require such programs as 
plaintiffs desire as they were held not to be mandatory as "appropriate action to overcome 
language barriers that impede equal participation by its students." 587 F .2d at 1030. 
32. Upon elaborating on the inappropriateness of judicial interference the dissent 
states: 
Insisting that a plaintiff surmount that threshold [showing of 
discriminatory effect) is precisely what safeguards against the 
judicial excess. . . . Should the judiciary intervene before the 
threshold of unequal treatment is crossed, however, and extend 
its power of judicial review to cases where treatment is not 
unequal, but motive may be impure, then the courts are, in 
effect passing judgement on the character and qualifications of 
the officers themselves and the government bodies through 
which they act rather than upon their official acts. 
582 F.2d at 72 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
33. [d. at 71 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 62. 
35. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
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when judicial deference cannot be justified as when both discrim-
inatory effect and purpose are shown. Therefore, where both dis-
criminatory effect and discriminatory intent or purpose are both 
present the majority and dissent would agree that judicial review 
is appropriate. 
As recognized by the court, De La Cruz reflects a problem of 
national importance: the disadvantage created by the burden of 
child rearing. The court found this burden "comparable to a wide 
spectrum of conditions afflicting many other members of the stu-
dent population; such as acute impediments to sight, hearing, or 
mobility and a narrow margin of economic self-sufficiency requir-
ing students to be wage earners while attending college."36 Al-
though it is not the prerogative of the judiciary to resolve these 
problems, the Ninth Circuit held that this case could not be 
resolved upon a construction of the pleadings. 
The impact of this decision is significant because it broadens 
the areas and issues of discrimination encumbering equal educa-
tional opportunities that may be alleged for remedy through the 
judicial process. The real impact of this decision will not be 
known until the ultimate disposition of the litigation. Should a 
denial of equal educational opportunity in fact be found in this 
case through the fourteenth amendment or Title IX, a tremen-
dous impact upon the educational system in the United States 
will result. De La Cruz is an important decision in having shown 
that on the pleadings, invidious discrimination may be alleged 
upon a showing of discriminatory effect through the decreasing 
the value of included benefits otherwise equal in value among 
classes through an action which, on its face, is neutral. 
Wayne B. Chew 
V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
United States v. Pinkus, 579 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. Aug., 1978). 
In a prosecution for obscenity, the defendant must meet a two-
pronged test to establish the admissibility of comparable materi-
als. The test includes a showing that the proffered materials bear 
a reasonable resemblance to the allegedly obscene materials 
which are the subject of the prosecution. In addition, the defen-
36. [d. at 64. 
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dant must establish "a reasonable degree of community accept-
ance of the proffered comparables." The court also found that 
the decision on whether or not to admit the com parables, and if 
so, how much of such e.vidence shall be admitted, is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. The decision should be made 
by the trial judge after a hearing out of the presence of the jury. 
In United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. Nov., 
1978), the Ninth Circuit ruled that a conviction for attempt to 
distribute cocaine cannot be attacked on the basis of impossibil-
ity if the jury believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defen-
dant intended to distribute cocaine. The case was one of first 
impression in the Ninth Circuit. Defendant distributed the sub-
stance, which was discovered to be lidocaine hydrochloride-
not a controlled substance, to an undercover agent. ·He was 
arrested and charged with distribution of cocaine, after a field 
test so identified the substance. In later laboratory tests, the 
substance was identified as lidocaine. Two jury trials resulted in 
mistrials and he was convicted at a third trial. 
The court refused to distinguish between factual and legal 
impossibility. The jury was correctly charged with the necessary 
elements for a conviction of an attempt to commit a crime, in-
cluding a specific intent to commit a crime and the commission 
of an overt act. Based on the evidence submitted, the court de-
termined it was not unreasonable for the jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant believed he was distributing co-
caine, thus meeting the required illegal intent to withstand an 
attempt conviction. 
In Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. Aug., 1979), the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the term "person" does not include a 
deceased for purposes of the Ku Klux Klan Act. The estate of 
decedent sued various public officials for an alleged conspiracy to 
cover up the wrongful death of decedent by three police officers. 
The complaint also stated a cause of action against the police 
officers for decedent's wrongful death under the Ku Klux Klan 
Act, which cause of action was not part of the instant appeal. 
The actions complained of, allegedly committed by the de-
fendants other than the police officers, all occurred subsequent 
to the death of decedent. The court held that a person's civil 
rights terminate upon death, so that acts committed after the 
victim's death may not be the subject of a conspiracy to deprive 
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decedent of his civil rights. The court distinguished cases which. 
allow a wrongful death action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1985" (1976), such as the case involving the three police officers 
who shot decedent, to survive where state law permits such ac-
tions. 
In United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. July, 
1979), the Attorney General, representing the United States, 
filed suit in the District Court of Montana, seeking injunctive 
relief based on the deprivation of constitutional rights of men-
tally retarded patients confined in unsanitary and unsafe condi-
tions in facilities of the state of Montana. The Ninth Circuit, 
avoiding any opinion on the merits of the case, determined that 
the only remedy available to the United States by the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bm of Rights Act is the with-
holding of federal funds for failure to comply with procedural re-
quirements of the Act. 
The court held that the doctrine of separation of powers re-
quires that the United States have specific statutory authority or 
"some interest that can be construed to warrant an implicit 
grant of authority" in order to have standing" to sue. Such an 
implicit grant of authority has been found in cases involving na-
tional security, obstruction of interstate commerce, and some pe-
cuniary interest on the part of the United States. The Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, in addition, 
contains state advocacy provisions which provide ample protec-
tion for the rights of the patients. The court relied on the doc-
trine of federalism as well as the traditional requirement that the 
complainant suffer some injury in fact, within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected by the statute. Reluctantly, the court agreed 
that the United States is not entitled to relief. 
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